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The last few years have been a particularly heady period for governments, private parties, and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") seeking to develop new rules to regulate intellectual property ("IP") protection standards. During that time, a slew of lawmaking initiatives, studies, and reports have been launched in a strikingly large number of international venues. Work on intellectual property rights is now underway in intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), and Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO"); in negotiating fora such as the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD") and its Conference of the Parties and the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; and in United Nations expert and political bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights and the High Commissioner for Human Rights.' In some of these venues, IP lawmaking has involved the negotiation of new international agreements. In others, IP norms are being generated through the reinterpretation of existing treaties or the creation of nonbinding guidelines, resolutions, and other forms of soft law. 2 This essay views these myriad developments through the lens of the international relations theory of regimes. 3 It uses the insights of regime theory to make three basic points. First, it explains why IP lawmaking has broken out of the confined institutional spaces of established international IP fora, such as WIPO and the WTO, and has expanded into a broad and growing array of other international venues in environmental law, human rights, and public health. 4 Second, it shows how this recent expansion helps to enrich regime theory itself by illustrating how regimes evolve over time and how they interact with institutions and actors in other issue areas.5 And third, it describes a working typology of the different modes of interaction that are developing among the many international venues in which IP lawmaking is now occumng.
L International Regimes and Intellectual Property Protection Standards
Regime theory was developed by political scientists in the early 1980s in reaction to the then-dominant realist paradigm of international relations. 7 Realist scholars assert that international rules and international institutions are epiphenomenal-that is, they exert no independent influence on the behavior of nation states. In response to realists' claims that these rules and institutions were all but irrelevant to how nations behave, regime theorists sought to demonstrate that states can derive substantial benefits from cooperating under conditions of relative anarchy. These benefits include reducing transaction costs, creating property rights, increasing access to information, monitoring state behavior, mediating disputes, and sanctioning noncompliance. In addition to identifying the causal factors that could lead selfinterested states to create international regimes, these early regime theorists made two principal contributions to understanding how nations behave. First, they revealed that states satisfy their demand for international rules and institutions not only through legally binding treaties and formal organizations, but also through softer forms of interaction, such as nonbinding declarations and informal government networks. Thus, Stephen Krasner's foundational article, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, defined regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." 1 0 This conceptual framework for analyzing interstate cooperation was far more capacious than the rule-orientated, doctrinal approaches favored by international legal scholars.
Regime theorists also had a second goal-to explore whether regimes, once formed, actually altered state behavior. Because regimes are created by states, it would be logical to assume that they could survive only so long as their benefits outweighed their costs to the governments involved. But political scientists showed that international regimes are often sticky. Their sunk costs, and the time and effort needed to create alternative institutions, discourage states-even powerful ones-from killing off or abandoning those regimes already in existence."
In the language of international relations theory, this stickiness causes regimes to function as "intervening variables" that independently influence state bargaining patterns and their resulting policy outcomes. 12 Given the constraints that regimes impose, what strategies have states and non-state actors used to tailor existing regimes to more accurately reflect their interests? One important strategy is "regime shifting," i.e. "an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international venue to another." 13 In the area of intellectual property, the most well known example of regime shifting is the successful effort by the United States and the European Communities ("EC") to move certain IP protection standards from WIPO to the WTO, a move manifested in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").
14 But the strategy of IP regime shifting has many earlier antecedents, such as the United States' promotion of the Universal Colrright Convention as an alternative to the Berne Convention in the 1950s, or developing countries' campaign to establish a "New World Information and Communications Order" in UNESCO in the 1970s. 16 The unqualified success of the United States and EC in linking international trade and intellectual property rights in TRIPS has encouraged scholars such as Peter Drahos to argue that regime shifting is a game that only powerful nations can play. 17 In fact, however, the post-TRIPS era has seen the emergence of a less well known second wave of regime shifting, this time by weaker developing countries that are increasingly dissatisfied with many provisions in TRIPS (or its omission of other issues) and are actively seeking out ways to recalibrate or supplement the treaty by relocating IP lawmaking initiatives to other international venues.
Revising Regime Theory: Evolution of and Interaction among Regimes and the Strategy of Regime Shifting
The existence of regime shifting by both powerful and weaker states raises intriguing questions. For example, exactly how could a strategy of regime shifting allow developing countries and their NGO allies to mount challenges to the TRIPS Agreement? And what did these states and nonstate actors hope to achieve by developing new intellectual property norms in fora not previously concerned with the products of human creativity or innovation?
Regime theory offers only limited guidance to answer these questions. In particular, the existing literature on how regimes evolve over time is under-theorized.
Such limited writings as exist assume that each international regime is discrete and governs only a single issue area (such as trade or human rights) without formal or informal relationships to other regimes. 19 What regime theorists have not fully considered is how actors respond when these clear boundary lines begin to erode through linkages of To flesh out these theoretical points, consider first what post-TRIPS intellectual property regime shifting could not do. It could not, at least as a formal matter, alter the obligation of developing countries to implement TRIPS standards into their national laws. Nor could it function as a back door way to denounce TRIPS (or, to be more precise, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations to which TRIPS is annexed). 22 To the contrary, developing countries remain at risk of WTO dispute settlement proceedings-and WTO trade sanctions-if they fail to adopt the IP protection rules that TRIPS requires.
But if regime shifting strategy could not directly undermine TRIPS, it could be used indirectly, first to generate what international relations scholars have referred to as "counterregime norms," and then to integrate those revisionist norms into the WTO and WIPO. The value of counterregime norms for developing countries is grounded in two fundamental characteristics of the international legal system. The first is the disaggregated and nonhierarchical structure of that system, and the second is the frequent use of nonbinding norms to guide the behavior of states and private parties.
With only a few exceptions, there are no clear hierarchies among international legal rules. Nor is there a supreme international judicial body or legislature with the power to comprehensively reconcile inconsistent rules or balance competing policy goals. 24 The absence of strong 
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hierarchies or of a centralized interpretive authority means that international lawmaking is often a messy business. But this messiness also creates strategic opportunities for states to advance competing approaches to the same subject in different international venues.
States often turn to soft law as a way to advance their preferred approach to a contested legal issue. At first, this claim may appear implausible. Why, after all, would states choose a method of lawmaking that by definition does not create legally binding commitments? But soft law can have advantages for governments, especially weaker governments, seeking hope to challenge the status quo. It is superficially less threatening to powerful states than hard treaty law. And it is easier and faster to create as compared to the often difficult and time-consuming process of negotiating new treaties. 25 But over time, soft law can have hard-edged consequences. It can serve as a focal point for gathering and exchanging information. It can help to reshape interests and preferences. And it can generate a rich set of principles, norms, and rules to challenge existing legal paradigms.
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In the wake of TRIPS, developing countries used regime shifting in precisely these ways, exploiting the disaggregated, nonhierarchical structure of the international legal system to create new and sometimes inconsistent norms in different international fora. 27 But developing governments did not stop at simply generating new rules and new conflicts. They used those rules and conflicts as the fuel for efforts to renegotiate legally binding intellectual property obligations in the WTO and WIPO.
Substantial empirical evidence supports this integrationist use of regime shifting. 2 [Vol. 36:123 protection rules. These proposals were not generated in a vacuum; rather, they expressly rely on soft law resolutions, recommendations, and guidelines initially adopted in the environmental, public health, and human rights regimes.
This integrationist regime shifting strategy has also helped developing counties to increase their bargaining power within the WTO and WIPO. Coalescing their demands around proposals first generated in other regimes facilitated a proactive negotiating strategy in which governments worked in groups -like the "Group of 21" that formed at last year's WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun -and stuck to predetermined proposals for reform.
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erhaps more importantly, reliance on these proposals changed the nature of developing countries' legal arguments. It allowed these countries to argue that the revision of intellectual property rules is not a selfinterested ploy to distort free trade or free ride on foreign creators or inventors, but rather part of a rational effort to harmonize nominally inconsistent legal obligations and normative objectives. This shifted the terms of the debate and allowed these countries to draw support from a wide array of actors and institutions to support their reform efforts. 3 '
Mediating Interactions among Actors and Institutions in an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime
So what has changed now that the principles, norms, and rules of intellectual property protection are being generated in multiple international venues? Treaty national legislation are all important factors. But new interactions and linkages among actors and institutions merit special consideration. 32 In the international intellectual property regime, these include: (1) granting the secretariat of one intergovernmental organization observer status in another organization, (2) establishing formal and informal partnerships between organizations to share information and lawmaking tasks; and (3) increasing cooperation and competition among actors and institutions engaged in intellectual property lawmaking. This section illustrates these points with a few examples.
A. Observer Status in the TRIPS Council and in WIPO
One way to influence intellectual property lawmaking is by participating as an observer in other intergovernmental organizations. Granting an intergovernmental organization "observer status" within a particular body of the WTO, for example, confers a defined set of privileges. Representatives of the organization may attend the meetings of the body, receive copies of all documents submitted to it, and may, upon invitation, address the body orally. 3 3 The right to speak does not, however, include the right to circulate apers or to make proposals . . . nor to participate in decision-making. ' But although denied these important avenues of institutional voice, organizations with observer status will be on hand to provide legal and technical advice to governments both inside WTO negotiating rooms and in the all important hallways outside.
Given these potential avenues of influence, it is not surprising that applications for observer status have triggered significant political disputes in the WTO. Members often disagree over the propriety of granting such status to a particular organization, and the guidelines for grantinf such status are flexible enough to permit plausible competing arguments. The 
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36 Guidelines for Observer Status, supra note 33, at 4 (requests for observer status are considered on a case-by-case basis, "taking into account such factors as the nature of work of the organization concerned, the nature of its membership, the number of WTO Members in the organization, reciprocity with respect to access to proceedings, documents and other aspects of observership, and whether the organization has been associated in the past with the work of [GATT]").
[Vol. 42 has granted observer status not only to intergovernmental organizations from the biodiversity, PGR, health, and human rights regimes, but also to dozens of international and national NGOs, increasing the ability of non-state intergovernmental actors to influence negotiations among WIPO members. 43 
B. Formal and Informal Partnerships and Information Sharing Mechanisms
A second mode of interaction among international actors and institutions in the international intellectual property regimes takes the form of formal and informal partnerships in subject areas of shared competence. In some cases, these partnerships are mandated by treaty; in others, more informal relationships arise on an ad hoc basis, as the activities of the two organizations become increasingly interlinked.
An example of treaty-based collaboration is found in Article 68 of TRIPS, which directs the TRIPS Council to "seek to establish . . . appropriate arrangements for cooperation with" WIPO. 44 The result of these efforts was a 1995 Agreement between WIPO and WTO. 45 The Agreement requires the two organizations to share information received from their respective members relating to intellectual property laws and regulations; mandates that each organization provide technical and legal assistance to developing countries that are members only of the other organization; and delegates to WIPO certain administrative functions contained in TRIPS. 4 6 In 1996, the CBD's Conference of the Parties suggested a similar information sharing mechanism by which states parties to both treaties would notify the TRIPS Council of laws and regulations adopted to implement the Biodiversity Convention's intellectual property provisions.
Examples of ad hoc institutional interactions are both more prevalent and more theoretically interesting. Most informally, one organization can unilaterally request another to review a specific subject area or consider a particular perspective. In Decision V/26 on Access to Genetic Resources, for example, the Conference of the Parties invited the WTO "to take into account the fact that the provisions of [TRIPS and the CBD] are interrelated and to further explore this relationship. '48 United Nations human rights bodies have made similar unilateral requests, adopting resolutions that urge the WTO to consider the human rights implications of TRIPS. 49 There is no guarantee, of course, that the requested organizations will respond favorably to these unsolicited requests.
C. Competition and Cooperation among Actors and Institutions
A more structured mode of cooperation occurs where one intergovernmental organization submits information to another, either at the request of the recipient organization or one of its member states. In 1999, for example, the TRIPS Council requested written submissions from the FAO and CBD relating to the Council's review of TRIPS Article 27.3(b). 5°T he Council renewed and expanded its request after Doha, seeking information from the secretariats of several intergovernmental organizations concerning their activities related to Article 27.3(b), the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD, and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 51 More formal work programs can be established when two organizations create a joint legislative agenda to regulate issues at the interface of their jurisdictional mandates. In 2002, for example, the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the CBD sought to enter into a "Memorandum of Understanding" with WIPO to address the intellectual lroperty issues raised by the Convention's traditional knowledge provisions.
Why would CBD member states seek such a memorandum? The answer, at least in part, relates to a competition between the organizations for primacy over a shared policy space. The CBD's Decision VL'20 on Cooperation with Other Organizations, Initiatives and Conventions reflects this competition. 3 It carves up the domain of genetic resources and traditional knowledge between the two institutions.
The decision recognizes the preeminence of WIPO as "the lead specialized agency to address intellectual property rights. '' 54 But in the politically contested area of traditional knowledge, the Biodiversity Convention's members claimed supremacy, stating that the CBD "is the primary international instrument with the mandate to address" the biodiversity-related innovations of 52 Convention on Biodiversity, Decision IV/9, Implementation of Article 86) and Related [Vol. 36:123 indigenous communities. 55 Unless WIPO acquiesces in this division of labor, however, there is no way to ensure that this claim of preeminence will be respected.
Not all of the relationships between WIPO and the CBD are so contentious.
To the contrary, in the area of biodiversity-related innovations, the two organizations have worked in harmony. To encourage states to use patent applications to police the Biodiversity Convention's access and benefit-sharing rules, the CBD Conference of the Parties asked WIPO "to prepare a technical study" on whether additional patent disclosure requirements would be "consistent with obligations in treaties administered by [WIPO] ," and "to report its findings to the [Conference]. discussed reveal that the shift of intellectual property lawmaking into new venues has made the international legal landscape substantially more complex. What began as a regime with a single intergovernmental organization-WIPO-then became a bimodal regime with two predominant organizations-the WTO and WIPO-and has now morphed into a multi-modal or conglomerate regime populated by numerous intergovernmental bodies and networks of regional and bilateral agreements.
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The consequences of this proliferation of venues for the future of the international intellectual property regime are still unclear. Two divergent evolutionary pathways are plausible. On the one hand, reviewing the same legal and policy issues in multiple fora may produce delays, inefficiencies, and inconsistent legal norms that inhibit regulatory solutions. On the other hand, such review may ultimately lead to better outcomes by generating a range of preliminary policy responses that prevents any a one organization from prematurely locking in an equilibrium that is sub-optimal or biased toward particular interest groups.
It is too early to make confident predictions about whether the benefits of proliferation will outweigh its costs. Although the strategy of regime shifting has opened up intellectual property lawmaking and dispute settlement to new avenues of influence and enhanced opportunities to link issue areas, it has also increased the likelihood of inconsistent obligations for states and private parties. It is this danger of incoherence that is an especially grave concern for an international legal system whose conflicts rules engender more confusion than certainty, and whose courts and tribunals are still relative neophytes at resolving the difficult issues that such inconsistencies can engender.
